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 Foreword
This is a report of the hearing that took place on Monday 25th January 2016, from  
16.30-19.00hrs. This was the fifth session in the ‘LSE Commission on the future of Britain  
in Europe’ series.
The hearing began with three keynote presentations:
•  Joaquin Almunia (Former VP of the European Commission; Commissioner for EMU,  
2004-10; Commissioner for Competition, 2010-14), ‘What Brexit might mean from an 
economic perspective for the rest of the EU?’
•  Dominique Moïsi (Professor, Sciences-Po; Senior Adviser, IFRI; Visiting Professor, KCL),  
‘The implications of Brexit for Europe’s common foreign and security policy’.
•  Sara Hagemann (LSE), ‘The Effects of Brexit on EU decision-making’.
A broad range of experts and practitioners were invited to participate in the discussion. 
These included guests with senior experience of political office; former diplomats; high-
level figures in banking, finance and trade; leaders of policy think-tanks; senior journalists; 
and, consultants and academics. For the discussion, we were keen to have contributions 
from a wide variety of EU and non-EU member states, in order to properly gauge the 
external perspectives on a possible ‘Brexit’ and we achieved that. As such, different shades 
of political opinion were also covered.
We are very grateful for the expert contributions made in our discussion and for the 
additional papers submitted in parallel to the hearing by both participants and non-
participants. Together, the material provided high quality evidence on which to draw 
conclusions. The hearing adopted the ‘Chatham House’ rule on not attributing comments 
to individuals in any public statement afterwards and this rule is respected here.
Marion Osborne provided excellent organisational support. David Spence helped greatly 
with the invitation list, the wider preparation for the hearing, and comments on an earlier 
draft. Any remaining errors in this report are my sole responsibility.
Professor Kevin Featherstone
Head of the European Institute, LSE.
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1. Introduction
An important dimension in the ‘Brexit’ debate is the impact of a possible UK withdrawal 
from the European Union on Britain’s partners, individually but also in their collective 
policies. For even a UK outside the EU will continue to be impacted by its policies and 
standing. This was the prime concern of the hearing on ‘External Perspectives on the 
UK’s membership of the EU’.‘Brexit’ would prompt early consideration of the kind of 
relationship the UK might have with the EU from outside. The hearing was an opportunity 
to discuss the expectations and interests of the rest of the EU with such an agenda.  
Specific attention was given to the existing relationships established with the EU by a 
variety of non-EU states in Europe - in particular, Norway – as these have entered the 
debate in Britain, and any such arrangement would structure the impact on the rest of  
the EU.
More widely, the external impact of a ‘Brexit’ impinges not only on the EU, but also on 
the rest of the world – amongst the UK’s main trading and investment partners and in 
key areas of foreign and defence policy. Thus, the hearing also considered the effects of 
‘Brexit’ on non-EU countries internationally.
The hearing focussed its discussion in two main policy areas: economic policy and foreign/
security policy. It also considered the impact of ‘Brexit’ on the pattern of EU decisions 
across policy areas. It opened with keynote contributions on each, then explored the  
issues raised.
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2. Summary
The conclusions of the hearing’s discussions 
were that:
•  The immediate ‘Brexit’ impact would 
be shock and uncertainty over how it 
can be managed. The best strategy for 
Britain’s partners would be to wait for 
London to present its proposals for a 
future relationship. Importantly the  
27 are unlikely to agree a first offer.
•  The alternatives to EU membership 
(following the Norwegian, Swiss, or 
Canadian models) are unclear, would 
be costly for the UK and produce few 
advantages. The search for a different 
solution might set precedents for new 
framework agreements with other 
countries like Turkey and Ukraine.
•  Economically, both sides will have an 
interest in trying to reach a trading 
deal as soon as possible, if the political 
climate allows it. 
•  Brexit will threaten an important 
market for continental exporters. 
Likewise, the EU27 represent a major 
market for UK exports.
•  On the EU side, member states will lose a 
major net contributor to the EU budget. 
They may well seek a high price for 
continued access to the single market.
•  Financially, the general uncertainty of  
a Brexit vote is likely to discourage  
FDI into Britain.
•  The prospect of restrictions on free 
movement between the UK and the rest 
of the EU would likely entail economic 
costs for both sides. 
•  Without Britain, the EU might become 
more ‘inward-looking’. In Council 
decision-making with qualified majority 
voting, France will become more 
pivotal in a number of areas. Britain is 
a long-standing advocate of freer trade 
and meaningful structural reforms. 
The relevant coalitions supporting 
such policies in EU meetings may be 
significantly weakened.
•  The EU would lose a member with one 
of its biggest military and diplomatic 
capacities, is its main advocate of 
interventionism, and which has the 
strongest link with Washington. ‘Brexit’ 
will weaken Europe’s ability to stand up 
to Putin’s aggression, its response to the 
challenges of jihadism, and its rapport 
with East Asia.
•  Politically, the domestic impact for 
Britain’s partners will be a boost to the 
extremes and to populists who advocate 
a block on Europe’s development or 
even their own exit. 
•  The presidential prospects of Marine 
Le Pen in France will look brighter and 
the voices of the far right in places like 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Greece and Poland will become louder. 
•  Following a ‘Brexit’ vote, the taboo over 
‘GREXIT’may begin to be lifted. 
•  Perhaps because other member states 
have been slow to react to the prospect 
of ‘Brexit’, a ‘no’ vote will shake the EU 
suddenly and deeply. It will pile on the 
agony amidst the migration and debt 
crises and deepen the general air of 
self-doubt.
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A UK referendum vote to remain in 
the European Union (EU) would elicit 
a huge sigh of relief across the EU and 
the capitals of Britain’s major trading 
partners. For the reality is that nearly 
all the UK’s main partners want it to 
remain inside the EU. Having been slow 
to appreciate the possibility that the 
referendum might result in a vote to leave 
the EU, the UK’s allies were suddenly 
confronted with a scenario of which they 
had little comprehension. They feared the 
ramifications. The British campaign seemed 
a ‘side-show’ alongside the immediate 
crises of the euro-zone and the flow of 
migrants into Greece and Italy, both of 
which excited the popular imagination 
much more. 
If Britain votes ‘no’ in the referendum, 
and thus to leave the EU, the latter will 
not collapse as a direct result. The survival 
of the EU is in the overwhelming interest 
of the other member states; there are no 
strong players in the foreseeable future for 
whom its breakdown would be the highest 
preference. Thus, a British ‘no’ vote creates 
an agenda for the kind of relationship 
the UK will have with a continuing system 
possessing significant economic and 
political clout. 
The immediate effect of a ‘Brexit’ vote 
will be high levels of uncertainty and 
confusion as to what might happen next. 
The international media will likely report 
panic across the world’s financial markets, 
and political leaders across Europe will 
be asked for their immediate reactions, 
no doubt adding to an impression of 
discordant voices as each seeks to interpret 
the implications and set out what might 
happen next. The strong belief of the 
participants in this hearing was that 
this outcome would lead to short-term 
disruption within and beyond the EU.  
It would have been difficult for Whitehall, 
any EU member-state government, or the 
EU institutions to prepare for a ‘Brexit’ 
scenario and such a vote would probably 
create confusion, instability and friction. 
Some suggest that, in order to sustain a 
shared interest in the flow of business 
transactions, the UK and the EU would 
come to an early agreement. But it is 
unclear what exit might involve in the first 
stage after a referendum ‘no’. Existing EU 
legislation – the ‘acquis communautaire’ 
– would likely remain in force in the UK. 
Britain might then have the option of 
deciding case-by-case, step-by-step which 
EU laws (‘directives’) to revoke. If this  
was to occur in parallel with negotiations  
for withdrawal, this could provoke 
antagonism from the rest of the EU.  
It could de-stabilise the agenda. But the 
scope to revoke EU laws at will rests on 
what Britain’s partners would require it 
to accept as the price for access to the 
single European market, and thus the 
fundamental shape of the overall decision 
post-Brexit. All parties assume such market 
access is an essential British economic 
interest. But a quick divorce agreement 
might assume an overly generous EU 
behaving in an unprecedented fashion. 
Some early political agreement that 
establishes a broad framework might be 
mutually acceptable, but it would then be 
subject to detailed negotiations. 
3.   The Day After…
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The evidence gathered by this hearing 
suggests that Britain’s negotiations over 
Brexit could well be difficult, prolonged 
and with an uncertain outcome. The 
expectation is that the negotiations would 
take years. Indeed, it seems unrealistic to 
expect that negotiations will be completed 
within the stipulation of two years, from 
the date on which the UK Government 
informs the EU of such an intention, as 
set out in Article 50 of the EU Treaty. The 
smart move by the EU would be to sit back 
and wait for Britain to make a proposal. 
Indeed, the political shock of a ‘no’ vote 
might lead the British government to hold 
a further referendum on membership 
options at some point – an option floated 
by likely leadership contender Boris 
Johnson early in the campaign – and 
Europe might prefer to allow the UK to 
clarify what it was requesting. 
In any event, the other 27 EU governments 
would probably struggle to reach a 
commonly agreed negotiating position. 
The expectation is that the Commission 
would lead the formal negotiations for 
exit, just as it does for new entrants, 
and this would require much political 
orchestration by President Juncker. 
Moreover, the European Parliament would 
be required to approve any deal for 
British exit and this would pose its own 
political challenges. Should the EU27 be 
able to establish a common position, then 
the UK might face a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
choice, given the considerable asymmetry 
in negotiating strength. If not, Britain 
would have some scope to manoeuvre and 
exercise ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics.
But the short-term political fall-out of 
a ‘no’ vote would likely involve some 
animosity: having been pressed by 
Cameron to accept his demands as the 
price of overcoming the ‘British problem’, 
his EU counterparts would feel let down. 
They might well question his judgement. 
If Cameron were to resign as a result of a 
referendum ‘no’, there would be greater 
uncertainty as to the direction on which 
Britain was about to embark. The EU27 
would likely be sensitive to the precedent 
that might be set by a UK withdrawal.  
It is not in their interest to create a positive 
scenario that might encourage euro-sceptic 
forces elsewhere. Significantly, the UK is 
due to chair the EU Council in 2017 at a 
time when it could be negotiating its  
own exit.
However, with a vote to remain in the 
EU, these nightmares would disappear. 
This would be one crisis averted, allowing 
Europe to return to its main business. 
Leaders across Europe would welcome a 
‘new start’ for Europe, an opportunity to 
put the EU back on track. 
the short-term political fall-
out of a ‘no’ vote would likely 
involve some animosity: having 
been pressed by Cameron to 
accept his demands as the 
price of overcoming the ‘British 
problem’, his EU counterparts 
would feel let down
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A referendum vote to leave the EU will 
focus attention deeply on the alternative 
options to membership. Contributors 
to the hearing regretted that the early 
campaigning had not fully explored the 
alternative options.
The main alternatives for the UK appear  
to be to negotiate:
a.  A Norway-type relationship with the 
EU, possibly involving it re-joining 
EFTA1. EFTA (minus Switzerland) and 
the EU have established the ‘European 
Economic Area’ since 1994, framing 
their trade arrangements.
b.  A relationship with the EU akin to that 
of Switzerland, which is somewhat less 
than that established by Norway. 
c.  A bilateral UK-EU free trade agreement, 
similar to that agreed with Canada (the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement, CETA) in 2014.
The hearing considered the various 
alternatives. It noted that Norway 
contributes over €800 million to the EU 
each year in order to acquire access to 
the single European market. If the same 
proportionate ‘levy’ was applied, given the 
UK has a population more than 12 times 
as big as that of Norway, the UK might be 
required to contribute some €9.8 billion to 
the EU. But this is a matter of speculation, 
given the uncertain outcome of post-
Brexit negotiations. This figure, though, 
compares to a net EU budget contribution 
in 2013 by the UK of €10.8bn, a possible 
saving of €1 bn.
In addition to its contribution of €800m, 
Norway is required to accept all relevant 
current and future single European market 
legislation. It does so without the right 
to participate in any of the EU’s decision-
making processes. In sum, Norway is 
obliged to apply the vast majority of EU 
laws, but without formal representation in 
the deliberative process. Critics see this as a 
form of taxation without representation.
For its part, Switzerland’s EU relationship is 
based on a variety of bilateral agreements: 
•  a Free Trade Agreement signed in 1972 
and extended in 1999 and 2004 to cover 
agricultural products; 
•  other agreements which cover mutual 
recognition of product standards and 
rules governing public procurement; 
•  a 1999 agreement on freedom of 
movement between Switzerland and 
the EU, under which each gave the 
other’s citizens the right to enter, live 
and work in its territory. 
•  In addition, Switzerland is an associate 
member of Europe’s border-free 
Schengen area and a full participant 
in the Dublin system for dealing with 
asylum claims.
•  Switzerland has participated in a 
number of EU research and educational 
programmes.
Switzerland is the EU’s 4th largest trading 
partner, while the EU is Switzerland’s 
largest. Over a million EU citizens live 
in Switzerland, and some 430, 000 Swiss 
citizens live in the EU.
4.   Looking at the alternatives
1  EFTA: the European Free Trade Area. The UK initiated its establishment in 1960 and remained a member until it joined the 
European Communities in 1973. Only Norway and Switzerland of the original EFTA members are now not part of the EU.
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A number of the provisions in the Swiss 
case might not be acceptable to a 
post-Brexit UK: notably, those on free 
movement, open borders, and asylum. 
Since 2004, Switzerland has agreed 
to contribute funding to the EU – an 
‘enlargement contribution’ – to support 
specific, high quality projects with the 
aim of reducing the economic and social 
disparities in the 13 new member states 
from Central Europe. In absolute terms, 
this is much less than Norway pays the EU.
A third option for the UK would be 
to try to emulate the EU-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement, agreed in 2014 after 
a protracted set of negotiations, lasting 
some seven years – itself a source of 
uncertainty and instability should they be 
replicated in the case of Britain and the 
EU. With the Canada agreement, however, 
over 99% of tariffs between the EU and 
Canada will be removed and it is expected 
to create sizeable new market access 
opportunities in services and investment. 
It is important to distinguish free trading 
access as in the case of Canada – involving 
the removal of trade tariffs – and full 
participation in the single European market. 
The adoption of the same product standards 
and regulations grants a country market 
access on the same terms as EU member 
states. This is not provided for in the Canada 
agreement. As in the case of Norway, the 
issue is participation in setting the rules and 
standards. The Swiss example of mutual 
recognition of product standards offers 
something similar, though at a significantly 
lower financial price. Moreover, Switzerland 
adopts EU product standards only for sectors 
governed by existing bilateral agreements.2 
Again, all sides would be sensitive to any 
new deal with a UK on the outside of 
the EU. A better deal for the UK would 
encourage other non-EU states to seek the 
same or stimulate other EU states to leave 
and demand similar. Moreover, any new 
agreement for the UK might set a model 
followed with Ukraine or Turkey.
Beyond these models, the UK might 
negotiate its own relationship based simply 
on common membership of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). This would 
likely be the minimal option in terms of 
trading access. A bilateral UK-EU trade deal 
would not by itself grant British businesses 
access to the markets of third countries 
that have negotiated their own deals  
with the EU. The UK would be obliged  
to negotiate such access separately.  
The asymmetries could weigh heavily 
on the speed and conditions of such 
agreements. The U.S. has 320 million 
consumers, and the EU has 500 million. 
Britain, with its 65 million, is a fifth the size 
of the US and a seventh the size of the EU. 
Similarly, China and Japan are both major 
trading partners of the EU and they are 
unlikely to prioritise the UK market over 
that of the EU when negotiating trade 
deals. In relative terms, Britain would have 
less economic clout to bring to bear in 
trade negotiations with its major partners.
The kind of deal that might follow a Brexit 
vote remains uncertain, but the economic 
implications for both Britain  
and the EU are huge. 
2  Since 1974, Switzerland has negotiated successive bilateral agreements with the EEC and later the EU, granting it 
access, first to free trade, then to the single European market in certain spheres. According to the Mutual Recognition of 
Conformity Assessment (2015), Switzerland must adopt EU product standards in the following areas: industrial production; 
agriculture; civil aviation; overland transport; and public procurement. 
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The UK is an important part of the EU 
economy, with some 2m jobs in the 
19-nation euro-zone dependent on trade 
with Britain.3 Half the UK’s imports come 
from the rest of the EU. In the short-to-
medium term, Eurozone exports to the UK 
would suffer a significant negative impact 
if, as foreign exchange markets expect, 
sterling fell sharply after a pro-Brexit result.
The broader economic impact of Brexit on 
the rest of the EU can be considered along 
several dimensions:
•  The internal EU effect on the relations 
between euro and non-euro states;
•  The consequences for trade and 
investment flows.
•  The influence of the EU on the 
international stage and, particularly, 
within organisations like the WTO.
• The implications for the EU budget.
•  Any new provisions affecting freedom 
of movement.
Several contributors suggested UK 
withdrawal from the EU would 
significantly weaken the bargaining 
position of the remaining non-euro states 
with respect to economic and financial 
policies. Their relative economic clout 
would be greatly reduced. A UK exit would 
change the balance of power between the 
euro-zone and the wider single market 
countries, with the former more able to 
impose their interests. 
The negotiation of Brexit might also 
prompt the EU to regard GREXIT 
(Greece’s exit) as more feasible. Greek 
membership of the euro-zone became 
highly problematic in 2015. This prompted 
serious investigation of how its expulsion 
might be facilitated. Its debt problem 
remains, whilst its third ‘bail-out’ and 
worrying economic prospects continue to 
be matters of major concern. Greece has 
remained inside the euro-zone, because 
its partners fear a domino effect leading 
to the disintegration of the ‘club’. But a 
negotiated UK exit from the EU might 
break such a taboo – for both the EU and 
for opposition forces within Greece – and 
make GREXIT from the euro-zone, and 
possibly other EU policies, seem more 
manageable. Such fears are already 
evident in political circles in Athens.
Within the banking sector, some believed 
intra-EU transactions would likely seep 
away from the City of London to the 
euro-zone. In this scenario, the City would 
cease to be the prime financial hub, since 
no longer the nexus between the global 
and European financial markets. Moreover, 
new EU financial regulations would be 
drafted without UK input. 
Further, Brexit would likely provoke 
competition between the UK and the EU 
for foreign investment. After a British vote 
to leave – and in a climate of uncertainty 
5.   The Economic Implications
3 ING Group (2016), Financial Markets Research: ‘The Shock from Brexit’. ING Group: Amsterdam.
Brexit would likely provoke 
competition between the 
UK and the EU for foreign 
investment
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- other EU countries would likely be keen 
to capture trade and investment diversion 
gains arising from the UK’s position outside 
the single market. The outcome of such 
competition must remain unclear. But in 
the near-term, the EU’s integration with 
the rest of the world in matters of global 
investment would likely decline, as the 
UK is Europe’s investment gateway in the 
services sector. The UK is also the biggest 
recipient of FDI within the EU. This is one 
aspect of the EU, without the UK, seeming 
to become more turned in on itself. 
Internationally, it can be expected that the 
euro-zone would be the EU’s dominant 
economic voice. Within the WTO, the 
EU would lose its strongest free-trade 
advocate. Trade multilateralism would 
continue, but Britain’s voice would be less 
influential. With respect to the IMF, there 
are already voices within the EU calling for 
a single European seat at the top table and 
this would be more likely to be realised 
if the UK had just left the EU. More 
generally, the EU without Britain could be 
expected to engage in its own ‘caucusing’ 
much more, presenting a more singular 
voice. This might be felt particularly in 
banking and financial deliberations, e.g. 
at Basle. It is not clear that such caucusing 
would help Britain’s interests.
With Britain no longer an EU member, 
the implications for the EU budget are 
unclear. The impact would depend on any 
financial contribution the UK might be 
asked to pay – a la Norway – for full access 
to the single market. Yet, the UK is second 
only to Germany as a net contributor to 
the common EU budget. Without Britain, 
Germany and France might be called upon 
to contribute proportionately more.
The provisions of any new deal after a 
Brexit vote that affect free movement 
of peoples and of workers will pose 
significant implications for the rest of 
the EU. Any curtailment is likely to have 
economic costs for both sides. Within 
the EU, the implications are greatest for 
the central European countries. This was 
evident during Cameron’s negotiations 
before the referendum was announced. 
The governments of Poland, the Baltic 
states, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and 
Romania each voiced concerns over a deal 
that would keep the UK inside the EU, 
but would discriminate between workers 
in their ability to move to new jobs. 
Similarly, many of these countries each 
have hundreds of thousands of workers 
currently in the UK and the workers from 
such countries currently in the UK might 
lose their status, with mostly negative 
consequences for their home countries 
denied their remittances. 
The economic effects of a UK withdrawal 
might also be acute for countries like 
Cyprus, Ireland and Malta with their 
traditionally close ties to the UK. Ireland, 
for example, might suffer a 20% loss in 
its trade with the UK, according to some 
estimates. But the the hearing underlined 
in general the significance of the UK-EU 
economic link as a whole and the risks of 
weakening it. In short, the EU needs the 
UK and the UK needs EU.
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In matters of foreign policy and security, 
the stark question arising from British 
withdrawal from the EU would be: is the EU 
a serious actor on the world stage without 
the UK? Many experts regard the UK as 
an indispensable part of the EU’s global 
strategic voice. The chances of the EU being 
a third pole in international relations would 
be diminished without the UK. Without 
the UK, the EU would likely become less 
interventionist in international conflicts. 
Brexit appears alongside numerous other 
geopolitical and domestic challenges faced 
by the EU. The rise of domestic terrorism, 
the issues posed by jihadism in the Middle 
East and Russia’s aggressive policy are major 
threats to the EU. Having Britain outside 
the EU would just add pressure and further 
complicate the approach to these issues.
With Britain outside, the EU’s international 
influence would be re-structured.  
The EU would lose its strongest voice in 
Washington, arguably to the detriment of 
European interests. Indeed, an EU minus 
the UK might be less NATO-friendly and 
more willing to develop separately, much 
to the chagrin of the US. And Britain is  
the one European power that understands 
the dynamics of East Asian politics.  
The EU will lose an important ally there  
if Brexit occurred.
Although it is not often recognised, the 
UK has been a strong supporter of the 
EU’s common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP). Indeed, many of the EU’s foreign 
policy successes can be attributed to 
British actions and suggestions. Moreover, 
it is difficult to identify any recent 
foreign policy issue in which the EU went 
ahead against the wishes of the British 
government. Instead, the UK has often 
leveraged the EU for its own foreign 
policy benefit. The British have notched 
up a number of successes in this respect: 
the Serbia-Kosovo agreement, the Iran 
deal, dealing with Somalia, and, sanctions 
against Burma. It has also favoured a 
common EU approach on sanctions against 
6.  The Geopolitical Impact 
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Russia; human rights in China; and peace-
brokering over Cyprus. British diplomats, 
like Catherine Ashton and Robert Cooper, 
have had significant personal influence. 
During a prolonged period of Brexit 
negotiation, the UK would be distracted 
and be less able to play a part in world 
affairs. Moreover, both the U.S. President 
and more recently President Xi of China 
have indicated that Britain would be less 
influential on the global stage if it were 
outside the EU.
There is a wider set of concerns related 
to how the balance of power will look 
inside the EU if Britain leaves. Both 
for France and for the US, a potential 
Brexit might rejuvenate fears of German 
hegemony, since Paris may not be able to 
counter-balance Berlin. Germany itself has 
struggled with its EU leadership position 
and would certainly favour Britain inside 
the EU as a source of power balance.  
This is a perspective shared by other 
northern European states, like The 
Netherlands and Sweden. Similarly, 
Brexit would re-structure the north-south 
dynamic within the EU, weakening  
the northern influence over policy.  
For their part, central and eastern 
European countries have, in the recent 
past, viewed the UK as an important 
ally and champion. London championed 
both EU enlargement and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The latter 
helped to structure relations with Ukraine. 
With Brexit, that reference point would go. 
In short, the internal power dynamics of 
the EU would be placed in a state of flux.
Brexit poses distinct risks for Ireland, 
both the Republic and Northern Ireland. 
The EU framework was an essential 
condition for both states managing the 
violence in Northern Ireland from the 
1970s to the Belfast Agreement in 1998. 
Constitutionally and in international law 
the two states are intertwined. If a Brexit 
vote led to a fresh referendum in Scotland 
leading to its secession from the UK, the 
impact on Northern Ireland could be huge. 
Unionists there might face a weakened 
England less willing to offer support and 
demands for Irish unity might disturb the 
new peace.
Brexit poses distinct risks for 
Ireland, both the Republic  
and Northern Ireland.
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The impact of Brexit on the decision-
making processes of the EU institutions 
and the outcome in terms of general policy 
direction was a matter of some speculation 
in the hearing.
Careful analysis of voting patterns in the 
Council of Ministers suggests Brexit would 
shift the balance of power towards a pro-
interventionist/social policy coalition, away 
from the more free-market, less red-tape 
orientation. The latter would suffer a 
substantial blow. Particular impacts would 
likely be felt in certain policy sectors, 
shifting EU positions on banking and 
finance, as well as nuclear and alternative 
energy. Some believe the rest of the 
EU would more easily press ahead with 
common policies and closer integration 
without Britain as the block, or awkward 
partner. Recent episodes such as the EU’s 
Fiscal Treaty were cited. But a popular  
‘no’ in the UK might also prompt more 
self-doubt and a be a brake on major  
new advances.
Other contributors felt British withdrawal 
would not result in a significant shift 
in policy direction by the EU. Some 
emphasised that the EU had already 
shifted towards policies intended to 
strengthen competition. Brexit would have 
little impact on the internal deliberations 
of the euro-zone. 
In terms of the workings of the EU 
institutions, a UK withdrawal might 
witness fewer ‘no’ votes in the European 
Council and in the Council of Ministers, 
as the UK was one of those most likely 
formally to register its dissent. In matters 
of qualified majority voting in the Council, 
France would likely appear more pivotal 
across voting blocks. A British exit would 
not affect the dynamics of the European 
Parliament significantly, as in recent years, 
and currently, British MEPs have not held 
particular positions of influence. 
Overall, a ‘Brexit’ vote and UK withdrawal 
would have an impact on the operation of 
the EU’s institutions. However, it is evident 
that several scenarios are feasible. Most 
likely, the EU would become more united 
and more interventionist in economic 
and social policies, with less need to 
accommodate distinctive UK preferences. 
A UK on the ‘outside’ could expect to 
negotiate with a more cohesive actor. 
7.   EU institutions and decision-making
Brexit would have little impact 
on the internal deliberations  
of the euro-zone.
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A referendum result in favour of the UK 
remaining in the EU would be strongly 
welcomed across Europe and further 
afield. The short-term threat – or political 
indulgence – of the referendum would 
be over. But the shockwaves of a Brexit 
referendum vote would likely be felt across 
the domestic politics of EU member states. 
The attention of the international media 
would help focus public debate on what 
this signifies for the European project, 
adding to the self-doubt engendered by 
the recent economic and refugee crises.
Britain has been the home of 
Euroscepticism for several decades, 
though it has spread in different versions 
across EU member states, nourished by 
specific domestic conditions. There was 
common agreement in the hearing that 
a referendum ‘no’ in the UK would give 
immediate political advantages to similar 
forces across the EU – in particular to the 
politics of populism and the extremes. 
A medium-term impact might be felt in 
France in the context of its presidential 
elections in 2017. The prospects of Marine 
Le Pen will look brighter. According to one 
recent poll, 53 per cent of French voters 
want a referendum on EU membership. 
Furthermore, that France rejected the 
proposed constitutional treaty in a 
2005 referendum renders questionable 
the assumption that the country – as a 
founding member – would vote to stay in. 
More generally, following a shock Brexit 
vote, the voices of the far right in places 
like Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Greece and Poland will likely become 
louder. This would have implications  
for the political climate and the images  
of Europe.
In short, the hearing perceived the political 
ramifications of a Brexit vote as not only 
unwelcome for mainstream politics across 
Europe, but also de-stabilising for a 
European project already struggling with 
several major challenges.
8. Domestic Politics takes a knock
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Where studies have tended to concentrate 
on the negative implications of Brexit for 
the UK, comparatively few have explored 
its likely impact on the EU. Nor have many 
sought to assess the perspectives on the 
topic of the UK’s external partners.  
This hearing sought to fill these significant 
gaps. In so doing, it reinforced the idea 
that there will be no winners from 
Brexit, with the EU suffering a number 
of potentially serious effects. Particularly, 
the hearing explored these through three 
main lenses: economic; geopolitical; and 
institutional, considering the impact both 
on the European Union as a bloc, and upon 
individual member states. The conclusions 
were illuminating and concerning.  
A Brexit vote on the 23rd June would 
lead to a period of uncertainty, whilst the 
UK government and the EU negotiate 
a new relationship. Moreover, a split 
might arise in the Brexit camp between 
those supporting a second referendum 
following negotiation of a new EU 
agreement – including Boris Johnson – and 
others committed to the view that the 
referendum result is final. The EU 27 will 
also find it difficult to agree a common 
position on a renegotiated settlement for 
the UK. Given the likely confusion, the EU’s 
smart strategy would be to wait for the UK 
to present its proposals, before advocating 
its own.
Existing EU agreements with Norway, 
Switzerland and Canada provide legal 
precedents for a new relationship, with 
advantages and disadvantages present 
in each model. Irrespective of which 
is eventually agreed, the economic, 
geopolitical and institutional ramifications 
of Brexit for the EU will be significant.  
This is particularly evident in respect 
to power dynamics within the EU, 
with Germany acquiring even greater 
influence - particularly in relation to 
France. Moreover, the EU would lose a 
main advocate of market liberalisation 
and structural reforms to promote 
competitiveness. In addition, Brexit would 
deeply affect certain countries – such as 
Cyprus, Ireland and Malta - that rely upon 
bilateral trade with the UK. Politically, 
there would also be ramifications.  
Brexit may help hasten GREXIT, breaking 
existing taboos surrounding member 
state withdrawal from EU schemes. 
Moreover, it might encourage the forces of 
nationalism across Europe, and legitimise 
their anti-EU arguments - a particular 
worry for France, with legislative elections 
in 2017. Geopolitically too, Brexit would 
considerably weaken the EU, its strategic 
voice on the global stage, and its ability 
to project power through diplomacy 
and military force. To compound this, 
the external perception of the EU as 
a security provider would also suffer. 
Institutionally, Brexit may presage a shift 
in voting patterns within the Council with 
advocates of market liberal policies losing 
ground to more protectionist and pro-
interventionist voices. Overall, the hearing 
concluded that Brexit would represent a 
‘lose-lose’ outcome for both sides. Perhaps 
because they have been slow to react to 
the prospect of a Brexit, a ‘no’ vote will 
shake the EU suddenly and deeply. It will 
exacerbate the migration and debt crises 
and foster the general air of self-doubt. 
9.   Conclusions
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